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The primary intent of this degree paper is to examine the problems
that confront the Georgia State Examining Boards, Division of Allied
Health in its efforts to discharge its function and to offer recommen¬
dations to address those problems.
This study is significant for several reasons. State Examining
Boards are purposely established to regulate occupations in order to safe¬
guard the public health and welfare, and to protect the public from being
mistreated or misled by incompetent or unscrupulous practitioners. The
boards also are responsible for interpreting and implementing state laws
governing the various occupations within the State of Georgia.
The major findings of this study are that: (a) the selection process
for board members is politically motivated; (b) the lack of an adequate
number of staff persons causes delays in the processing of applications for
initial and renewal of licenses; and (c) the investigations of charges
against professionals as well as the imposition of sanctions against
guilty professionals take an excessive period of time.
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The main sources of information for this study were participant
observation and interviews. A wide variety of books and journals was
also used.
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The regulatory procedure of licensing professionals is perceived
to be a peculiarly American institution, although the basic concept
was formulated many years earlier in the European tradition. The
licensing of professionals, at first, involved the wealthy in society
who were educated at the best institutions in America and several
European countries.
The first American state to enact licensure standards was Virginia
in 1639, followed by Massachusetts in 1649 and New York in 1665. These
states were motivated to require licenses due to complaints of excessive
charges brought against so-called professionals or quacks, particularly
in the medical profession. More than one-hundred years had passed before
thirteen of sixteen states granted authority to legislate the examination
of licensure in the medical profession. Essentially, this legislative
enactment led the way for the improvement of the quality of services
rendered by professionals.
Substantial changes in licensure evolved by the second quarter of the
nineteenth century. A wholesale deregulation of the professions of law
and medicine also transpired as a response to the egalitarian sentiment
of that period. By the era of the Civil War there were no effective
state licensing systems in operation. Many citizens were dissatisfied
with the professionals due to the following: (1) they made matters so
complicated and complex that non-professionals could not be responsible
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for themselves or argue their point of view in a court of law, or even to
interpret the essential information needed for basic everyday living;
(2) the presence of monopolies in trade; and (3) they maintained a subor¬
dinating upper class system that hoarded privileges and blocked entry of
the lower class citizens. 1 Therefore, with society becoming more egalita¬
rian in nature, professional practices and performances were controlled
by the legislature on the state level. The states legislated practice of
licensing professionals serves to counter some of the unpredictability
within the professional arena. The practice added consistency and coor¬
dination among the professions.
The proliferation of licensed professionals in the twentieth century
was accompanied by an increase in centralization in the control of licen¬
sing. There was also a change from title restricting laws to practice
restricting laws, with a greater increase of eligibility and competence
standards for professionals. In an effort to maintain coordination
between occupations and knowledge, autonomous state administrative licen¬
sing boards for each profession were established. The general purpose of
these boards is to assess, distribute and renew professional licensure.
However, establishment of these regulatory boards certainly injected
politics into the licensure arena. Political power impedes upon the
ability of the boards to influence or restrict laws. As a consequence
of this power, certain professional associations are able to monopolize
^L. Tabachnik, Licensing in the Legal and Medical Professions, 1820-
1860: A Historical Case Study, ed. L. Tabachnik, Professions for the People
(New York: Schenkman, 1976), p. 19.
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practice in their professions for their members.
In 1821, Georgia became the first state to restrict medical licen¬
sure to graduates of professional schools. However, opposition to
licensure was strong from the apprentice trained physicians. These
physicians assumed that licensure was a threat to their group. This
too was the perception of other quasi-health practitioners.
Initially, there were only two licensing boards. The two boards
governed the occupations of law and medicine. However, the Dent vs.
West Virginia court decision in 1882 created ten occupations for licen¬
sure.^ Within the next two decades, the number of occupations doubled,
while the number of state licensure laws increased from 110 to a total
of 195. By 1920, the number of occupational licensures rose to a total
of thirty.3 In 1982, the Consumer's Resource Handbook estimated that
there were 1,500 state boards licensing more than 550 professions and
occupations.^
Many requirements for the attainment of licensure by professionals
have changed over the years. The apprenticeship system of entry for
licensure is outdated in its original form. It is now incorporated
under the auspices of educational institutions in the form of intern¬
ships, fellowships or cooperative education. For most occupations,
^Dent v. State of West Virginia, 129 IJ.S. 114, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231,
32 L. Ed. 623 (1882).
-^Stanley Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses: Licensing and the Profes¬
sions (Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1980), p. 58.
^Ibid., p. 59.
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the amount of time required for accreditation or certification into
professional occupations has increased significantly.
Like other states, the State of Georgia has a centralized regulatory
agency with separate licensing professional boards. The primary function
of the boards is to interpret and implement the state laws governing
occupational licensure in the state. Presently, the State of Georgia
regulates forty-three professional occupations.
Ultimately, the purposes of regulating occupations are to safeguard
the public health and welfare, and to protect the public from being
mistreated or misled by incompetent or unscrupulous practitioners.5 The
legal basis for the regulation of professionals is provided for in the
Georgia Code, 1933, Title 84.
The Medical Board, established in 1825, was the State of Georgia's
first licensing board. This was followed by the Dentistry Board in
1892 and the Pharmacy Board in 1901. Essentially, the establishment of
these boards sought to provide stability and conformity within the
professional arena. Before the creation of these boards, many "non¬
professionals or quacks" were rendering inferior services to the citizens
of Georgia. Therefore, the creation of these state regulatory boards
served as a mechanism to counter some of the laxity and incompetence in
occupations by instituting licensure by examination. Licensure by exami¬
nation is designed to assess the knowledge and ability of the professional.
If an individual does not rate high enough, then the license to practice
^Horace R. Hansen, Medical Licensure and Consumer Protection: An
Analysis and Evaluation of State Medical Licensure (Washington: Group
Health Association, 1962), p. 1.
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in his/her given field is denied. In order to receive a license to
practice, the professional must exemplify knowledge and ability to perform
successfully in the profession. In addition to the measurement of compe¬
tency level by the use of examination, other variables are used by the
board. These include effective completion of internships or apprentice¬
ships (if applicable), level of educational attainment, citizenship, and
the designated application process for licensure.
In 1932, the Georgia legislature placed the then fifteen autonomous
state regulatory boards under the auspices of the Secretary of State.®
Consequently, the centralization of these regulatory boards relieved the
Department of the Governor of the demanding responsibilities of success¬
fully overseeing each professional regulatory board within the State of
Georgia. As a result of this legislative action, the centralized licen¬
sure boards were placed in the Division of the Georgia State Examiners
Boards J
Since the centralization of the regulatory boards, the Georgia
legislature has created governing boards for twenty-seven professional
occupations. One of the most recent boards to be created is the Georgia
Examiners of Dietitians. This particular board was created after much
political debate by the Georgia Dietitics Association (GDA).
Since 1984, the GDA has lobbied the Georgia State legislature to
pass a bill that would bring greater respect and awareness to the profes¬
sion. The association, composed of certified dietitians, considered
®The Executive Reorganization Act of 1931.
^Interview with Shirley Cowat, Deputy Joint Secretary, Georgia State
Examining Boards, Atlanta, Georgia, August 7, 1985.
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themselves as a viable part of the profession. However, the helping-
services' of the dietitians were not placed on the same level with other
professional associations. For example, dietitians are not compensated
by Blue Cross, Blue Shield Insurance Companies for home health visits,
unlike other home health professionals. Consequently, the struggle of
the GDA to gain recognition continued through February 2, 1985. On this
particular date, the House of Representatives passed the bill which
created "licensure by examination" for all persons using the title dieti¬
tian. The Senate also passed the bill on February 9, 1985. Finally,
after much intense lobbying efforts, Georgia Governor Joe Frank Harris
signed the bill on April 4, 1985. All facets of the law went into effect
on July 1, 1985. The regulatory board was placed within the State
Examining Boards, Division of Allied Health on July 1, 1985.
The writer, having served as an intern with the State Examining
Boards, Division of Allied Health, suggests that there are crucial problems
confronting the regulatory boards. The presence of these obstacles makes
it very difficult for the regulatory agency to achieve the established
goals and objectives in the regulation of professionals. Professionals,
even though governed by the boards, are often perceived by the public as
being incompetent practitioners.
Moreover, the Georgia Board of Examiners has been charged with
overlooking the incompetence of these professionals by permitting the
"licensing for life system." Therefore, the ultimate purpose of this
paper is to examine the problems that confront the Division of Allied
Health of the State of Georgia Examining Boards in its effort to discharge
its functions and to offer recommendations to address these problems.
II. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
A. Agency and Unit Description
The writer served as an intern with the Georgia Secretary of State,
Division of the State Examining Boards for a period beginning June 3,
1985 and ending September 26, 1985. The internship was under the auspices
of the Governor's Internship Program.
The State Examining Board is a centralized administrative agency for
the distribution of forty-three different occupational and professional
licensures within the State of Georgia. Essentially, the major purposes
of the regulatory agency are to protect consumers and to regulate profes¬
sional occupations. As a result of the Reorganization Act of 1931 passed
by the Georgia Legislature, occupational regulatory boards were placed
under the auspices of the Secretary of State.
In an effort to apportion some of the extensive responsibilities,
the Secretary of State appoints a Joint-Secretary of State to head the
centralized regulatory boards. The Joint-Secretary is responsible for
all actions of the state agency. Various responsibilities of the agency
head include keeping and maintaining all records and files relating to
the examining boards; overseeing all orders and processes related to the
effective implementation of all governmental regulations pertaining to
the boards. Furthermore, the Joint-Secretary is the recipient of all
applications for licensure; schedules a time and place for all hearings
with the consent of the particular boards; and issues certification upon
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the authority of various regulatory boards. In addition, it is the
responsibility of the state regulatory agency to appoint investigators or
District Attorneys and bestow upon them police powers in order to conduct
investigations for various boards.
The Joint-Secretary may appoint a deputy to assist him/her with the
centralized agency functions. In addition, executive directors are also
appointed by the Joi nt-Secretary. The directors are responsible for the
provision of guidance and direction to their respective staff members;
keeping records and minutes of each board session; carefully evaluating
and processing renewal applications; and assisting with examinations as
required by law for licensure. The executive directors are assisted by a
support staff consisting of an application specialist, principal secre¬
taries, senior secretaries, consultants, and auditors.
B. Internship Duties
The Division of Allied Health includes the Georgia Boards of Exami¬
ners for Licensing Practical Nurses, Physical Therapists; Occupational
Therapists; Recreation Therapists; and the newly created Board of Dieti¬
tians. Primarily, the writer's responsibilities included the development
of rules based on the laws governing the Dietitians' Board and designing
the application materials used for assessing an applicant's credentials
for licensure.
The writer's first project was to research the laws governing the
dietitians and to establish rules to simplify the application process.
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These rules enumerated in detail the requirements for licensure of
dietitians. Applicants must meet these requirements before they are
licensed. Some of the requirements of the Examiners of Dietitians
include: the attainment of a bachelor's, master's, or Ph.D. degree from
an accredited institution, relevant apprenticeships or internships,
references to ensure credentials of applicants, criteria for renewal and
reinstatement, professional code of ethics, and fee schedule.
As a result of these requirements, the writer developed a mechanism
to verify the credentials of all applicants. This mechanism included
among other things, the use of an application form, which sought to
provide the board with all relevant information needed to assess the
overall capabilities of the applicant. In order to ensure that each
applicant had received the necessary internship or apprenticeship to
qualify for licensure, the use of supervised field work forms is
imperative.
Fundamentally, these measures are used by the Georgia Board of
Examiners of Dietitians to obtain the ultimate goal of the State Examining
Boards, which is to protect the public from harm and fraud at the hand of
incompetent practitioners.
C. The Statement of the Problem
The generally stated purpose of licensing and the primary justifi¬
cation for the use of state professional and occupational regulation is
to ensure quality in services offered to the public on a statewide basis.
However, the word "quality" presents a complex problem.
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Hamilton in Health Care Consumerism, 1982, argued that quality does
not mean perfection, neither must it mean the same services by the same
kind of providers. Instead, Hamilton suggests that it is a range of
acceptable variance in the relation to the price charged.8 Begun, author
of Professionalism and the Public Interest, implies that the word quality
may refer to the degree of respect for the professional , the degree of
communication or humanism in the professional-client reactions or the
outcome of the services rendered.9
Unfortunately, the complexity of conceptualizing quality has a
trickling effect on the public, as it relates to occupational standards.
The public views the line between initial application to obtain a license
and the maintenance of that particular license, to be a very rigorous
one. The,percept ion is that the state regulatory agency does not demand
or adhere to the same quality measures inherit in the initial licensure
of professionals. Moreover, there is little done to discipline errant
practitioners, or even to properly address the needs of the under served
population. Instead, the contention is that the state licensing agency
simply supports the "licensing for life system." That is, once a profes¬
sional is licensed he/she simply renews the license every two years and
maintains the license for life. Much too often the licensee does not
have to present evidence that he/she is still qualified to practice in
^Paul A. Hamilton, Health Care Consumerism (St. Louis: C. V.
Mosby, 1982), p. 71.
9 John W. Begun, Professionalism and the Public Interest (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1980), p. 75.
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the respective capacity, except in rare cases. Rare cases may include
having charges of misconduct brought against the licensee. Similarly,
Hogan states that boards tend to be more zealous in prosecuting unlicensed
practitioners than in disciplining those already licensed.10
The purpose of this study therefore is to examine the problems con¬
fronting the Georgia State Examining Boards, Division of Allied Health.
Specifically, these problems are related to the following:
A. The Criteria for the Selection of Board Members
B. Inadequate Staffing of the Regulatory Agency
C. Difficulty in Measuring the Competency Level of Professionals
D. Difficulty in Implementing Disciplinary Procedures
10d. B. Hogan, A Study in the Philosophy and Practice of Professional
Regulation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1979), p. 25.
III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Since the beginning of history, there has been a state of uncertainty
about values and traditions throughout society. Many of the values and
traditions entail the practice of soliticing services from individuals
who profess to be professionals. The uncertainty centers around the
credentials of the professionals and the quality of services rendered to
consumers. Therefore, the act of regulating professional occupations was
introduced as a mechanism to counter some of the uncertainty and hence,
to create a stable foundation in society for the delivery of specified
services to citizens.
Houle, in 1980, noted that inadequacies among the so-called profes¬
sionals has increased at an alarming and disillusing rate since 1965.
According to him, three factors are responsible for the situation. The
first factor focused on the perceived failure of professionals to service
the entire population, especially the poor and alienated. A second
factor centered on the perceived pursuit of self-interest by many profes¬
sionals. The third factor focused on the accusation that professional
practices demonstrate incompetence, inattention, dogmatism, lack of
feeling and malevolence.^ Furthermore, Houle asserted that professionals
are seen as grasping, careless elite groups responsible to no one, rather
than being an altruistic group of experts whose ethics ensure the quality
He. 0. Houle, Continuing Learning in the Profession (San Francisco:
Jassey-Bass, 1980), p. 1.
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of their services at a fair price.^
Lenrow's book, Dilemmas of Professional Helping: Continuities and
Discontinuities with Folks Helping Roles, gives an analysis of professional
licensure that indicated that the problems of the professions cannot be
separated from other problems in our highly mobile and increasingly
anonymous society. He contrasts two types of helping relationships among
professionals: (1) aid to strangers in distress and (2) long-term social
exchange. Aid to strangers in distress is characterized by service to
persons outside the helper's usual social network in a temporary relation¬
ship. In this relationship, the helper has great power which is used to
help the outsider without prospects of reciprocity. On the other hand,
the term long-term social exchange refers to services given to known
persons who are a part of the helper's network or reciprocal obligations.
This service is part of a complex series of social interactions charac¬
terized by cooperation, sharing, mutual benefits and long-term common
fate.
A study conducted by Carman in 1958 revealed that the association
between the historic professions and the church controlled medieval
university made professionals "a class apart." Emerging from the domina¬
tion of the church, medical professionals formed associations in England
121bid., p. 27.
13p. Lenrow, Dilemmas of Professional Helping: Continuities and
Discontinuities with Folk Helping Roles (New York: Academic Press, 1978),
p. 272.
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in the sixteenth century, which eventually evolved into guilds. Pharma¬
cists, architects, dentists, engineers and accountants followed a similar
path.14
Carlson, described licensing as going from a presumed remedy to a
problem: "licensure statutes are defended vigorously by the professions
because of their loss of power as a result of making the violation of the
professional monopoly punishable as a crime."15
Hardcastle, in his analysis of occupational regulations, cal led the
need for legal protection an "expedient of the occupation on the make."
The occupation then exists, ironically, as a profession through the use
of public institutions and in opposition to the public interest.
Legislative acts permit regulated occupation to refuse to accept
grievance procedures not under their immediate control. Such acts provide
regulated occupations the authority to define the terms of practice,
legal mores, and intellectual mandate to determine for the individual and
society at large what is healthy, moral, ethical, deviant, normal or
abnormal.
A. Carman, "The Historical Development of Licensing for the
Professions," The Educational Record (1958): 269.
^Roberta Carlson, "Health Manpower Licensing and Emerging Insti¬
tutional Responsibility for the Quality of Care," Law and Contemporary
Problems (1970): 860.
A. Hardcastle, "Public Regulations of Social Work," Social
Work (1977): 14.
-15-
Liberman detailed the kinds of activities that can be used to justify
licensing of professionals. They are:
1. Activity which when negligently performed may lead to death
or serious bodily injury.
2. Activity which may result in deprivation of legal rights.
3. Activity involving a breach of trust which can lead to
serious psychological or economic injury.
Mechanic suggests that professional-client relationships, particularly
in medical care are characterized by great inequality in knowledge.^
Moreover, Payne asserts that the consumer has great difficulty in comparing
professional services prior to consuming them.19 Gross agrees with the
above stated viewpoints. He asks the question can the public be protected
from its own ignorance? Gross suggests that the public cannot be protected
because of the inaccessibility of information. Information which is of
benefit to the consumer is often difficult, costly and time-consuming to
obtain and requires too much sophistication for ordinary citizens to
understand.™
K. Liberman, The Tyranny of the Experts (New York: Walker and
Company, 1970), p. 246.
l^D. Mechanic, Future Issues in Health Care (New York: Free Press,
1979), p. 42.
19p. E. Payne, "Licensure: Professionals and Occupations," Report to
the Commerce Committee, H. R., State of Washington, Olympia, 1977.
2°Gross, Of Foxes and Hens: Licensing and the Health Professions,
p. 17.
IV. METHODOLOGY
This paper employs descriptive analysis to provide an indepth
description of some of the problems confronting the Georgia State
Examining Boards, Division of Allied Health and how these problems
impinge upon the division's ability to carry out its functions.
A. Primary Data Collection Techniques
The writer utilized participant observation and interviews with
Mrs. Shirley Cowat, Deputy Joint-Secretary and Mrs. Patricia Swann,
Executive Director, Allied Health Division as main sources of primary
data for this study. These two individuals were selected for the inter¬
views because of their vast reservior of knowledge about the operations
and functions of the State Examining Boards in general and the Division
of Allied Health in particular. As an intern, the writer responded to
numerous complaints from irate callers and logged these complaints in a
personal notebook which served as the basis for the formulation of
these problems.
B. Secondary Data Collection Techniques
Secondary data were collected from a variety of sources that
includes books, articles, lectures, and journals. The writer relied
heavily on the publications by Stanley Gross, Of Foxes and the Hen
House: Licensing and the Health Professions and D. B. Hogan, The
Regulation of Psychotherapists, Vol. II: A Handbook of State Licensing
Laws.
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V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS
A. Conceptual Framework for Analysis
The writer employs the use of descriptive analysis in an effort to
describe and analyze the problems confronting the Georgia State Examining
Boards, Division of Allied Health.
The act of licensing professional occupations and businesses is a
mechanism to protect the public from harm and fraud at the hands of
incompetent and unethical practitioners. Without the implementation of
such a regulatory process, society would suffer irreparable physical
harm, emotional injury, or financial loss at the hands of practitioners
whose lack of skills, knowledge or ethics make them unable or unwilling
to foresee or forestall the commission of hurt to those they are supposed
to serve.21
Despite regulations, occupational licensures continue to proliferate
in the fifty states. Since 1952, the number of occupations licensed in
one or more states have increased dramatically from seventy to a total of
five hundred.22
A study by Kleiner et al., suggests that the significant increase in
professional licensures can be attributed to geographical mobility.





valuable to workers particularly in times of economic restraints. In the
absence of any constraints, workers tend to relocate in areas of fast¬
growing demands where the incomes are high.23
Some state licensing boards recognize out-of-state licensures.
However, most impose a variety of conditions before they permit newcomers
to practice in their jurisdictions. Newcomers must complete the prospec¬
tive state's application process before license is granted.
The emergence of newcomers for licensure only worsens the existing
problem of ensuring competence in the Allied Health field. Once licensed,
the newcomers also become blanketed into the "licensing for life system,"
and are contributory to the problems listed in section II of this paper.
This paper attempts to analyze the previously stated problems and dis¬
cusses how these problems confronting the State Examining Boards affect the
attainment of the goals under the licensing provisions for professionals
in the State of Georgia.
B. The Criteria for the Selection of Board Members
Since 1932, Georgia's Occupational Licensing Boards have been empowered
with the authority for interpreting and implementing the laws governing
occupations. Although, the State of Georgia has forty-three centralized
regulatory boards, each is a separate entity, headed by its own board
members.
The licensing board is an administrative unit which receives power
from the state legislature to permit or to regulate both occupational
^Morris Kleiner, et. al., "Licensing, Migration and Earnings:
Some Empirical Insights," Policy Review (February 1982): 510-522.
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activities and the legitimate use of occupational titles. Significantly,
state regulatory boards have become part of the executive branch of
government because they assume the roles of the legislature and the
judiciary. Regulatory boards are perceived as legislative in procedure
since they have the authority to make rules. On the other hand, the
boards also employ the use of judicial authority as they deny, suspend,
discipline or revoke licensures of profssinals.̂4
The utilization of structured regulatory boards has changed signifi¬
cantly since the Reorganization Act took effect in 1932. Earlier licensing
board members were comprised of individuals elected by associations. The
present system succumbed to the use of appointments by the Governor.
However, the Governor is usually politically coerced by associations to
appoint certain members. The State of Georgia's licensing system requires
the membership of boards to be composed of individuals appointed by the
governor from professional associations and the public-at-large.
Shimberg, in 1979, explored some of the problems of incorporating
the public as members of a licensing board. The public member serves as
a liaison between the professional association and the general public.
However, Shimberg asserts that Governors usually epitomize these positions
as part of their graven patronage. Therefore, these positions are filled
without regard to public expectations.25
24F. Waddle, Licensure: Achievements and Limitations, Vol. II:
The Study of Credentialing in Nursing (Kansas City: American Nurses
Association, 1979), p. 37.
^Benjamin Shimberg, "Recruiting and Selecting Members for Occupa¬
tional Licensing Boards," remarks before Advisory Committee by Governor
Graham, Tallahassee, Florida, 11 April 1979, p. 10.
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In order to appreciate the importance of the selection and the role
of board members, it is of necessity that one understands the process of
licensure. In the Division of Allied Health, the application specialist
receives all applications for licensure. This individual is also
responsible for ensuring that every application package is complete,
i.e., transcripts, letters of recommendations, etc., are provided by the
applicant. The completed application packages are then given to the board
members for review and approval for licenses. In most instances, the
review and approval process calls for individuals to be familiar with the
conversion of continuing education units to meet part of the requirements.
This calls for an individual who is very conversant with such a process.
Unfortunately, some of the board members are not familiar with this
process. Consequently, individuals have been licensed who are not
qualified.
The process of the selection of the board members is very political.
Although one can make the argument that the governor yields to political
pressure in selecting board members from the ranks of the various profes¬
sional associations, at least those individuals are qualified. However,
the same argument cannot be made for the political appointees from the
public-at-large. Even those appointed from the professional ranks may
not necessarily represent the most qualified and competent individuals
from the association, but rather those who wield political clout.
Since every profession has its own jargon or terminologies that are
familiar to only those individuals in that profession, the layman, and in
this case, the public board members are at a clear disadvantage. In the
course of the boards deliberations, words and terminologies are thrown
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around that are totally foreign to some of the board members. For example,
of the seven hoard members on the Georgia Examiners of Dietitians, four
are professional association members; one a housewife; one a retired school
teacher; and one a secretary. This creates a situation in which a 1 ot of
time is wasted during meetings to explain and clarify some of the jargon
and technical terms to the public board members. In the opinion of this
writer, this lack of background of the public members in the given profes¬
sion handicaps their effectiveness. Shimberg contends that public board
members have not been successful in discharging their functions because
they feel their views are insignificant, as such, any citizen irrespective
of background can serve in that capacity.26
Another crucial concern relates to the amount of time the board
member invests in providing quality service to the public. The LPN Board
meets every other month, whereas, the Physical Therapist Board meets
every six months. Between the meetings, many investigative situations
may arise within the professional arena. These situations must be delayed
until the next scheduled meeting, whether it is held within a one month
or a three month period. In varying instances, board staff members may
attempt to handle the problem. However, during the intervals between
board meetings a practitioner who has violated the code of ethics may be
allowed to continue practicing until the board convenes before investiga¬
tions can be authorized. For the most part, Hogan charges that most
boards do not pursue investigations and enforcement in spite of the avail¬
ability of financial resources to do so. The board often creates another
261bid., p. 11.
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problem of having a large surplus of resources at the end of the fiscal
year. Hogan asserts that boards, therefore, take in more money in fees
and fines than they have spent in regulations.27 In an interview with the
Director of Allied Health, she agreed with Hogan's assertion in that the
Allied Health Boards usually have a surplus of financial resources avail¬
able at the end of the fiscal year.28 However, these excess funds cannot be
legally utilized to hire additional staff.
B. Inadequate Staffing of the Centralized Regulatory Agency
The writer views the lack of employment of adequate staff by the
State Examining Boards as a problem. This situation contributes to delays
in processing applications for new licenses as well as for renewals.
Certainly, an understaffed licensing organization cannot effectively keep
pace with the growing number of Allied Health professionals in the State
of Georgia.
In the Division of Allied Health, one staff person is responsible
for the activities of at least two separate regulatory boards. These
activities include the collection and servicing of all application packages
(for both licensees and applicants for licensure); the remittance of all
funds; recording and filing all test scores; distributing licenses;
keeping all records and minutes of board sessions; serving as a liaison
between the public and board members; keeping board members abreast of
2?n. B. Hogan, The Regulation of Psychotherapists, Vol. II: A
Handbook of State Licensing Laws (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger,
1979), p. 271.
2&Interview with Mrs. Patricia N. Swann, Director of Allied Health,
State Examining Board, Atlanta, Georgia, February 13, 1986.
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current information pertaining to licensees; recording and filing of all
board materials and typing. In addition to all the above stated respon¬
sibilities, the staff persons are also engaged in answering the numerous
daily telephone calls that come in from throughout the state. During the
internship, the writer observed that at least the staff persons spent
about half a day on the average responding to various inquiries from
callers. Since there is no receptionist to screen incoming calls, the
staff persons must answer the phones. This is a very time-consuming
function which undermines the ability of the staff persons to carry on
with the other day-to-day functions and responsibilities.
Presently, licensed within the State of Georgia in the Allied Health
field there are about 36,000 L.P.N.'s; 500 Occupational Therapists; 1000
Recreationists; 1500 Physical Therapists; and about 50 Dietitians who
will be grandfathered^ -jn until June 30, 1986. It is quite obvious that
with the increasing number of licensees within the State of Georgia,
there should be a reasonable number of staff persons to service them.
However, the state contends that the underlying problem with acquiring
additional staff is the unavailability of financial resources. The
failure of the State Examining Boards to increase the number of staff
persons has resulted in many problems, such as the inability of profes¬
sionals to work because the application process for license renewal is
marred by delays. This situation imposes excessive stress on the employees
in the work environment.
An employee's attitude survey conducted by the Georgia Secretary of
State in 1985 revealed that the employees do not see any opportunity for
^Grandfather clause permits 1 icensure without examination.
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growth and development. Employees were very dissatisfied with the inequa¬
lity in the pay scale for the amount of work performed. The workers
asserted they did not receive effective communication throughout the
organizations. However, the employees in the examining boards section were
the most dissatisfied among all the agencies.30 Other problems of the
State Examining Boards are the high turnover rate among employees and the
low morale of the remaining ones.
In a study by Cohen, it was contented that regulatory boards' staffs
are ordinarily inadequate to carry out investigations. In addition,
Cohen suggests that the statutory provisions for such investigations were
often marked by ambiguity and the lack of precision.31 Cohen, in another
study also suggests that short staff licensing organizations cannot keep
pace with the number of complaints received.32
In an exclusive edition of ProForum, it was indicated that even
with legal authorities, the lack of state funds and adequate staff are
the reasons for the message to the public that "You're not protected
here.",i. e., by the state regulatory agency.33
In a legal study conducted by Grad and Marti, the conclusion was that
medical boards suffer as far as disciplinary proceedings are concerned.
This is a result of inadequate staffing and inadequate record-keeping, if
3°Survey of Georgia Secretary of State's Office, Employee Attitude
Survey, administered Spring, 1985.
31H. S. Cohen, "Professional Licensure, Organizational Behavior, and
the Public Interest," Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 51 (1973):
73-83.
32ibid., p. 84.
33"Efforts Expanded to Check Professional Misconduct," ProForum, 1
(1978): 3.
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records are kept at all. In a nine state survey, Grad and Marti were
told by staff that running a licensing program left little time for
anything else, including the management of a disciplinary program. This
accounted for the minimal record of accomplishments in investigating and
the lack of follow-up on complaints.34
A study done by the Arkansas Consumer Research revealed the following
inadequacies of the board staff:
Responses to an ACR survey by 113 out of 175 boards
indicate that one-third of the boards do not investigate
complaints against service providers. This is due to
laxadaisical attitudes about enforcement. The report also
concluded that many of the boards were ineffective in
keeping records.^
D. Difficulty in Measuring the Competency Level of Professionals
The measurements used to assess the competency levels of practitioners
(professionals) within the State of Georgia raise crucial concerns. The
occupational regulatory board generally measures competency on the basis
of constructs which can be easily measured, despite the lack of empirical
validation. Unfortunately, the measurement of such constructs is generally
unrelated and insignificant to the capabilities of the professional .36
Specifically, Georgia State Examining Boards establish four basic
criteria to measure the competency level of a professional. The four
34f. P. Grad and N. Marti, Physician's Licensure and Discipline:
The Legal and Professional Regulation of Medical Practice (Dobbs Ferry,
New York: Oceana Publications, 1979), pp. 22-23.
^Arkansas Consumer Research cited in S. Clemons et al ., Arkansas
State Regulation v. the Public Interest (Little Rock: Arkansas Consumer
Research, 1981), p. 39.
36p. s. Pottinger, Competence Testing as a Basic for Licensing:
Problems and Perspectives (California: University of California Law
School , 1977), p. 16.
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types are: personal characteristics, i.e., age; citizenship and residency
within the particular jurisdiction; level of educational attainment
(levels vary for each profession); any work experiences, including
internships or co-op programs and the results of written and/or oral
examination.
The writer contends that requirements such as citizenship and
residency have little revelance in assessing one's competency level.
Furthermore, written examinations, in many instances, lack validity. Too
often qualifying examinations are poorly designed, constructed, validated
and very often misinterpreted by the recipient. The writer agrees that
criteria such as educational attainment level, moral character and the use
of work experiences are, indeed, important constructs used to substantiate
competency levels. However, most measures used by the regulatory boards
rely too heavily on invalid criteria.
According to Benham, in 1980, the major purpose for licensing is to
provide "career insurance." Career insurance is manifested in the level of
educational attainment of an individual , which in turn is used to purchase
a job protected from various aspects of labor market competition.3?
Hogan asserts that there is no relationship between licensing require¬
ments and competency levels. Hogan claims assessment techniques have to
do with social selection rather than competency levels.38 More importantly,
3?L. Benham, The Demand for Occupational Licensure, ed. S.
Rottenberg, Occupational Licensure and Regulation (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute, 1980), p. 57.
38d. B. Hogan, The Regulation of Psychotherapists, Vol. II: A
Handbook of State Licensure Laws, p. 280.
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Hogan asserts that there is underrepresentation by some groups and discrim¬
ination in competency assessment. He argues:
If academic credentials are required for entry
into a profession, and if these credentials are not valid
or reliable measures of competence, if minorities, women,
the poor and the aged have greater than normal difficulty
in obtaining these credentials, then it is reasonable to
assume there is underrepresentation and that discrimina¬
tion has taken place.39
Gross comments very astutely on the issue of measuring competency.
He sees the major problem posed by the traditional paper and pen tests of
knowledge as only tapping a very small part of the richness of human
behavior and the capacity for the individual to express himself.40
The main contention is that competency is a construct, and never
seen directly. However, it is observed in the behavior or the performance
of the professionals. Competency is displayed when the professional makes
sound judgements about the use of certain knowledge, skills and wisdom in
particular situations.
E. Difficulty in Implementing Disciplinary Procedures
Licensing according to the literature, does not prevent incompetent
practices. Several studies in the medical professions have shown that in
the practice of medicine, 5 percent of America's doctors are not fit to
practice and only twenty-six states use incompetency as a reason for
disciplinary action. Alcoholism and drug addiction have been cited as
the leading contributors to indiscipline, while, substance abuse, unsanitary
39Ibid., p. 281.
^^Gross, Of Foxes and Hen Houses: Licensing and the Professions,
pp. 117-118.
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conditions, mental incapacity and professional misconduct play secondary
contributory roles in decisions of indiscipline.41 All these factors, no
matter how insignificant they may appear, affect the quality of services
provided.
As extensive as the problem may be, licensing boards only respond to
reported problems and often refuse to carry out investigations seeking to
uncover and discipline the professionals. There is a reluctance on the
part of professional licensing board members to invoke disciplinary
actions against their fel low practitioners. In addition, taking practi¬
tioners to court may lead to the boards having to defend their roles.
Board members refuse to seek court appraisal of their performance in
cases of negative court rulings.
The imposition of sanctions against a licensed professional who has
violated any of the laws and rules governing his or her profession takes
a long time. Usually, a minimum of four weeks to a maximum of four years
is required to conduct investigations. The process involved in taking
disciplinary actions against practitioners charged with misconduct or
malpractice includes:
A. Receipt of a written complaint against the individual
by the board.
B. The board notifies the accused of the charges brought
against him or her.
C. The board sets up an official investigation.
D. If it is ascertained that there are merits to the alleged
charges, a hearing date is set up. The accused is, there¬
fore, given an opportunity to refute those charges.
41Hogan, The Regulation of Psychotherapists, Vol. II: A Handbook of
State Licensing Laws, p. 283.
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E. If the accused fails to disprove the charges, and those
charges are minor, then the board may reprimand, suspend,
or revoke the license. However, if the charges are major,
the board immediately revokes the license and the matter
is turned over to the courts. In either case, the accused
is entitled to appeal the case within a thirty day period.
What is disturbing about this disciplinary process, especially if
the licensee is found guilty of malpractice, is that the individual can
continue to practice until all the due processes have been exhausted. In
such a case, the safety of the public is at stake. On the other hand,
the board has absolutely no control over an unlicensed practitioner who
engages in professional practices. Such an individual is sent directly
to the courts. In spite of the disciplinary process outlined above,
there are occasions when the board fails to act with alacrity. Since
violations call for the imposition of severe sanctions (e.g. suspension
or revocation of license) and since the livelihood of the practitioner
depends upon the maintenance of his/her license, board members are, at
times, very reluctant to follow up on charges against licensed profes¬
sionals. Above all, in cases where clients have successfully won mal¬
practice suits against professionals, these professionals find it difficult
to retain insurance. Such a situation leads to professionals giving up
their practices. Consequently, the public pays higher prices for those
services. Licensing, therefore, can be painful both to the practitioner
and the client who receives the services.
VI. CONCLUSION
Similar to most human activities, governmental regulations are
prompted by the best of motives. As in the activity of licensing of
professional occupations, the State of Georgia intended this particular
regulation to aid the public -- the weak, the strong, the rich, and the
poor by providing them assurance of quality services rendered by licensed
practitioners. However, the motive for licensing occupations has become
entangled with regulations. It is the opinion of this writer that licensing,
more generally, protects those in the regulated occupation than it protects
the consumer. Too often, licensing boards use their statutory powers
primarily to restrict entry and prevent competition.
Licensing boards have been charged with operating a blanketing
system, i.e., once a professional is licensed, no periodic assessments of
that individual are necessary. Today, society depends more on professional
services than ever before. The inability of the regulatory boards to
closely monitor their licensees creates a situation whereby professionals
are able to render services without using current and state of the art
methods. This writer is of the opinion that the political influence which
plays a very significant part in the selection of the members of the
State Examining Boards greatly compromises the selection process. In
addition, the lack of the employment of an adequate number of staff
persons is a disservice to both the public and the professionals because
-30-
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this situation not only jeopardizes the livelihood of the professional,
but also endangers the public. More importantly, the reluctance on the
part of the boards to pursue investigations of alleged malpractices as
well as the snail pace at which the disciplinary process proceeds should
be of concern to the public. Professionals will remain entrenched and
unaware of their real impact and resistant to change until such time that
the public becomes suspicious of professionalism and the legitimacy of
the licensing laws.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are offered to address the selected
problems confronting the Georgia State Examining Boards which were
addressed in the analysis section of this paper. The State should:
1. Select Board members from among individuals whose
backgrounds have sufficiently prepared them to
understand the issues relevant to the profession
to be regulated. These individuals should neither
be members of the association or professionally
affiliated with it.
2. Employ more qualified staff persons to handle the volume
of work in the division. In addition, a receptionist
should be employed to answer routine calls and to refer
calls which require expert knowledge to the appropriate
staff person.
3. Drastically reduce the lengthy disciplinary process in
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